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or separation of “information” by sensory 
systems from the effective causality which 
transports it (Polo, 2002). This process gen-
erates information as such, and makes it 
available to superior levels of cognition and 
to behavior. In our opinion, such aspect of 
cognition is not explained by the Bayesian 
modeling of the brain.
One of the consequences of this omis-
sion is that the unified science of mind and 
action Clark proposes makes a deficient 
distinction between cognition and action. 
Action is a causal intervention of the liv-
ing being in the world, but it is only an 
action inasmuch as it is informed by cog-
nition. This leads to a different, although 
connected, sense of intentionality (Moya, 
1990). The dissolution of cognition in a 
causal effective process blurs, as a conse-
quence, the distinctive features of actions.
However, the representational model 
proposed by Clark could be useful to 
understand some sort of secondary levels 
of cognition and practical action. In fact, we 
would like to propose a neural substrate for 
the so-called “Bayesian brain.” This should 
be a brain region able to integrate the top-
down prediction with the bottom-up PE. 
Clark cautiously proposes a possible can-
didate for such interaction between predic-
tions and PEs citing Friston (2005, 2009) 
and Mumford (1992) models. However, we 
believe a different option should be taken 
into account.
The striatum is the main receptor of cog-
nitive, sensory, motor, and emotional infor-
mation within the basal ganglia, a group of 
nuclei intimately involved in action from a 
wide point of view (decision-making, action 
selection, procedural memory, and instru-
mental learning, among others; Redgrave 
and Gurney, 2006). This special involve-
ment in action puts the striatum in a pref-
erential position to be a biological substrate 
of the “Bayesian brain.” On the other hand, 
midbrain dopaminergic neurons located in 
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Clark offers a detailed description of certain 
current views of the brain that define it as 
a “prediction machine.” According to these 
accounts, it is a hierarchically organized 
processing unit whose main role is elabo-
rate top-down predictions about sensory 
inputs, and compute a bottom-up predic-
tion error (PE) which will help refine future 
predictions. The ultimate stable state, says 
Clark citing Mumford (1992), would be the 
delivery of a signal from the cerebral cortex 
to lower areas which would fully predict the 
sensory information they are receiving. In 
this state, the PE signal would not exist at 
all. In Clark’s opinion, the brain is a “black 
box” which receives information from the 
world without a direct access to it: “[the 
brain] must discover information about the 
likely causes of impinging signals without any 
form of direct access to their source”; that is, 
it just perceives the perturbations that these 
signals are causing on its own state, makes 
predictions about the nature of the signals, 
and elaborates a response.
In our opinion, the main problem of 
this view is the description of cognition as 
prediction, and prediction as some sort of 
representation. Perception, hence, is just a 
mean to correct previous predictions. This 
eludes the question about the very nature of 
cognition. In fact, if we understand cogni-
tion as a representative activity, there are two 
possible interpretations: cognition could be 
either (1) the process that generates the rep-
resentation or (2) the resulting representa-
tion itself. In (1) we identify cognition with 
a causal process, and this neglects the fact 
that a representative activity is only possible 
if guided by a previous cognition. In (2) we 
face the problem of explaining what is to 
know the representation: if cognition is a 
representation, we need a representation to 
know the previous one, and so on in infini-
tum. However, inasmuch as cognition goes 
beyond the mere generation of a prediction, 
a representation can be compared with the 
reality that represents. This comparison is 
a cognitive activity irreducible to the rep-
resentation itself.
In addition, representation is not possible 
without some kind of previous “presenta-
tion.” Clark’s example of the black box is 
very illustrative. He overlooks that cogni-
tion itself means the suppression of the 
“black box problem.” The confinement of 
an entity into a “black box” is a problem 
only if that entity is a cognitive system; that 
is, only a unit with the ability of cognition 
can be deprived of the possibility of com-
paring a representation with the external 
reality that represents. We think this clarifi-
cation is especially important to understand 
the more basic sensory and perceptual lev-
els. Vision, for instance, is not a representa-
tion of the world, but a codification of some 
information about the world. This intrinsic 
relation between cognition and the world 
can be called intentionality, using a word 
reintroduced by phenomenology, but only 
if, unlike phenomenology (Gallagher and 
Zahavi, 2008), we disentangle intentionality 
from consciousness. Following the example, 
vision does not need to be conscious to be 
cognition; it just need to apprehend some 
information (i.e., color) that is in relation 
to the world. This could be considered a 
“presentation” (in a weak sense) of reality.
This understanding of the cognitive 
activity is necessary to accept the existence 
of representations, which are an important 
way of knowledge, although they are not 
the first level. Assuming this, the interac-
tion between the brain and the world has 
not only an effective or impinging character, 
as Clark states. The basic and more general 
level of cognition consists of the abstraction 
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the substantia nigra pars compacta and ven-
tral tegmental area have been reported to 
convey a PE signal to striatal areas (Schultz, 
1998). Its representation in the striatum 
has been widely demonstrated in humans 
(Tobler et al., 2006). In fact, Clark men-
tions the role of this nigrostriatal PE signal 
in different sections of his article. Moreover, 
anatomical studies have also demonstrated 
that the same striatal neurons targeted by a 
dopaminergic input also receive projections 
in the same synaptic spine from associative, 
motor, and limbic cortices – those possibly 
carrying the predictions Clark mentions in 
his model (Gerfen and Surmeier, 2011). The 
result of this interaction between the neu-
ral signals of priors (from the cortex) and 
errors (from the midbrain), together with 
the modulation from striatal interneurons 
(Bernacer et al., 2012), could determine the 
activity of striatal projection neurons, thus 
facilitating or inhibiting the performance 
of an action.
In conclusion, a holistic theory of the 
mind should distinguish cognition from 
action in a sharper way than Clark does. 
Action is a causal process arising in the sub-
ject and aimed to the outside world, but it 
is also guided by cognition itself. This is the 
key feature of action. We also believe there 
are enough evidences to propose the stria-
tum, part of the basal ganglia, as the neural 
substrate of Clark’s proposal on practical 
action. On the other hand, the difficulty of 
disentangling information from causality in 
laboratory experiments makes difficult to 
find a neural substrate for sensory cognition.
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